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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a historical commentary on arguments in theory of 
property that reinforce the vision of strong and clear property rights 
dominant in developmental policy today. Building upon the article from 
Duncan Kennedy in 2013 that analyses this vision, this paper tackles 
additional issues in emergence of the vision. In doing that the paper relies 
on broadly genealogical approach to focus on a binary opposition that 
has been present in the theory of property almost since its historical 
establishment in Western thought. This methodology allows us to 
conceptualize the problem in more substantive terms than Kennedy does 
and show how radical shift is necessary to overcome the problems that 
the vision entails.
I 
Let’s try to imagine two worlds.1 
In one of those worlds we find the individual confused as to what resource she 
is entitled to use. It is equally unclear to her in what way she is entitled to use it. 
There are many legal limitations and her ownership is weak and unstable. Further-
more, others also seem to be entitled to the same resource in this weak manner. 
For this reason, it is hard for the individual to determine where the other’s entitle-
ment stops and hers begins. As a consequence, the individual living in this world 
is confused with regards to her duties and obligations in relation to the resource. 
As she is not the sole owner and her entitlement is limited, she certainly is not the 
only one obliged to care about the resource, or at least to care about the whole of 
the resource. Finally, if the individual has a need for a different resource than the 
one she is entitled to, she will be powerless to do anything about it. It will be very 
hard for her to change the one for the other, as her entitlement is a weak one and 
others entitled to the same resource would have to agree to the transfer. As the say-
ing goes, what belongs to everybody, belongs to nobody.
1  This paper is a byproduct of the research on relation between commons and law-and-eco-
nomics conducted under supervision and in cooperation with prof. Ugo Mattei.
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Turning to the other world we are confronted with a completely different reality. 
In it, the individual is the sole owner of the resource and her entitlement is strong. 
It is easy for her to determine what resources she is entitled to and in what way she 
is entitled to use them. In truth, to the extent that she is not limiting other’s use of 
their resources by using the resource she owns – she is not doing anything wrong. 
Clearly, with such a strong entitlement, duties come hand in hand. The individual 
is obliged to take care of the resource, not to spoil it in any way. In rare cases she 
might be obliged to give it up to the sovereign if its’ use is necessary for a common 
benefit. Besides the obligation, the individual has a reason to care for the resource 
in every possible way, as she would be the one to suffer a loss of utility from its’ 
destruction. Finally, if the individual has no direct need to consume the resource 
she is entitled to, she will always have two ways to deal with this situation. As the 
sole and full owner of the resource she will be in the position to sell it to an inter-
ested party. Or, which is even better, she will be in the position to extract in a sus-
tainable way the use values of the resource and sell them. 
Looking at these two contrasting pictures a rhetorical question comes to mind: 
“Who would not want to live in the better world?”
Clearly, the persuasive power of this argument lies in its obviousness and its ap-
peal to the common sense. As consequence, the imagination of these two contrast-
ing worlds has defined our way of thinking in many diverse fields. How should we 
deal with externalities that result from the interaction of economic actors? How 
should deal with state owned companies? How should we compare different his-
torical property regimes? How should we interpret the malfunctions of non-market 
arrangements or hybrid markets? Finally, if markets exist but do not lead to desirable 
outcomes what could be the cause for that? In all of these cases the reality appears 
to be at odds with the ideal world of strong and clear property rights. The contrast 
between the two worlds has an analytical purpose, but that is not all. The analysis is 
followed by the prescription. If reality is disagreeable it has to be changed and the 
vision of clear and strong property rights is there to lead us in the right direction.
For almost half of a century this vision has been implicit in the dominant view 
on economic development (Kennedy 2011), it has been the foundation of Interna-
tional Property Rights Index (internet), it has played a central role in the renowned 
Doing Business Reports (internet) and it has been the topic of multiple studies (Ken-
nedy 2011). 
Duncan Kennedy (2011) was the first to explicitly treat this vision of clear and 
strong property rights in a critical manner. He argued that it serves as both an an-
alytical and historical claim. (Kennedy 2011: 3) In his view, the vision of clarity and 
strength of property rights is a false one as we can observe that very different prop-
erty arrangements have led to economic growth (Kennedy 2011: 5). Additionally 
what seemed to be clear and strong ones at least from standpoint of some social 
actors also lead to stagnation and crisis. Finally, Kennedy showed that this vision 
moves the attention away from crucial issues of choices among different social in-
terests involved in different modes of property entitlements, distributions of re-
sources and related developmental paths (Kennedy 2011: 7).
Kennedy argued that the vision is founded upon a number of lay conceptions 
about property (Kennedy 2011: 7). These represent property in its ideal form as 
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something that can be distinguished as a system of private ordering from public 
regulation, has irrelevant distributive effects, is not concerned with issues of social 
justice. Finally, if the goal underlining the vision is to set an economy on the right 
path by facilitating growth, it can easily lead in turn to exclusion of alternative de-
velopmental paths (Kennedy 2011: 10). The fact that each of these claims has been 
clearly contradicted in legal scholarship leads us to the obvious question of how 
has it come to develop and establish itself in such a dominant fashion. 
Kennedy made some comments on the history of the vision of clear and strong 
property rights (Kennedy 2011). I will argue that this vision has deeper and stron-
ger roots than might be expected if one takes into account that only in the last half 
of the century it has become explicitly present and pervasive in issues of econom-
ic policy. I will try to show that a more thorough and conceptually powerful his-
torical account can and should be made. The vision of clear and strong property 
rights has been developing throughout the history of Western thought in a quite 
particular manner. 
An account of this development clarifies how a preference for strong property 
rights could become so commonsensical. Following up on the description at the 
outset of this paper, I want to argue that in its essence this contrast of two worlds 
operates as a binary opposition. A classic form of a binary opposition is the pres-
ence-absence dichotomy (see e.g. Derrida 1976). As it is well known, in much of 
Western thought, distinguishing between presence and absence, viewed as polar 
opposites, has played a fundamental role (Macsey and Donato 1970: 254). In ad-
dition, according to post-structuralist criticisms, presence occupies a position of 
dominance in Western thought over its’ opposite, absence, that is conceived as pure 
lack of that what can be present. As binary oppositions are such a fundamental trait 
of Western thought, it stands to reason that they also characterize the domain of 
property. What makes the case of interpreting this vision as based on binary oppo-
sitions compelling is the explicit reference to clarity and strength, features largely 
developed during the Enlightenment. The issue is closely linked to all those that 
are in focus nowadays in the treatment of the contrasts to clarity and strength, i.e. 
non-conformity, ambivalence and weakness related to gender, race etc. Thus, the 
ability to acknowledge the binary opposition in the foundation of the vision of clear 
and strong property rights should allow us to approach property with fresh eyes.
As it will be shown in the following sections, it allows us to see that because of 
the logic of the binary opposition, strong and clear property rights are understood 
as the presence, or put simply the only coherent way for property to exist. Every-
thing that does not fit the vision is left out and interpreted as absence, that is, as 
if it is not a system of property rights at all (Royle 2000). Secondly, as in case of 
any binary opposition, we have the opportunity to trace its genesis in history. The 
history in question is at the same time the history of thought and of our legal sys-
tems. Engaging with this history should allow us to substitute the commonsensical 
appearance with a historical specific reality (Royle 2000). Finally, the fact that we 
are dealing with a binary opposition implies operation of reduction and erasure (of 
really existing diversity) that is foundational for the vision. Our ability to grasp this 
erasure should allow us to see what property in reality is, what has been ignored in 
thinking about it and excluded in law making (Royle 2000).
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For the present purposes I want to comment on a number of fragments from 
the history of thought that has led to the emergence of the vision of strong and 
clear property rights. The goal of the exercise will be to show how these discourses 
spanning across centuries all fall under the operation of reduction and erasure of 
property understood in any way other than strong and clear exclusive rights of the 
individual agent. Even though sphere of property law in all times included many 
other arrangements, reflections about property have in an equally pervasive man-
ner ignored this multiplicity. As it has become quite usual today in the discourse on 
clear and strong property rights, any absence or limitation to this arrangement is 
taken to be the directed against property itself and is unconditionally condemned. 
Before we begin two caveats are in order. First of all, this commentary is not 
intended to be exhaustive with regards to any of the bodies of thought that it ap-
proaches. Due to the overarching goal, these will really be treated as fragments. 
The expectation that will hopefully be justified is that even as only fragments they 
will be enough to reconstruct the foundational character of the opposition. Second-
ly, as the other mentioned dimensions of this subject are inseparable I will touch 
upon the legal history and the legal reality that has been excluded in thought and 
marginalized in practice but this will be only occasional.
II
1
It is unclear where one should start with the history of this binary opposition. As 
we have seen, it has been engraved in the proverbs spanning across cultures and 
traditions. According to most historians, if we exclude different examples of Ar-
istotelian tradition, the first explicit milestone can be found in the reflections of 
William Blackstone who equates property and possession. 
The importance of William Blackstone in history of law is incontestable. In his 
highly influential Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765–1769) he has given 
us the best-known natural-law definition of private property as the “sole and des-
potic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of 
the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.” 
Narrative in the foundation of Blackstone’s account of property has at least two 
peculiar traits. Mattei and Capra (2015) show that this narrative is a cartesian one 
in the broad sense2 and that it relies on the fundamental distinction between phys-
ical (res extensa) and mental (res cogitans). Thus, as Hohfeld (1913) famously not-
ed, Blackstone’s discussion of property relies heavily on the distinction between 
corporeal and incorporeal.
...An hereditament... includes not only lands and tenements, but whatsoever may be 
inherited, be it corporeal or incorporeal, real, personal, or mixed... Hereditaments, 
then, to use the largest expression, are of two kinds, corporeal and incorporeal. 
Corporeal consist of such as affect the senses, such as may be seen and handled by 
2  This should not be confused with actual work of Decartes but only interpred as part of 
tradition that in many ways simplified his work. Thanks to Mark Losoncz for this insight.
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the body; incorporeal are not the objects of sensation, can neither be seen nor han-
dled; are creatures of the mind, and exist only in contemplation. (Blackstone 1830) 
Further on, Blackstone struggles to apply Cartesian narrative to property and 
define the specificity of incorporeal: “An incorporeal hereditament is a right issu-
ing out of a thing corporate (whether real or personal), or concerning, or annexed 
to, or exercisable within, the same” (Blackstone 1830).
As Hohfeld (1913) notices, there is inextricable confusion between the physical 
or “corporeal” objects and the corresponding legal interests, all of which latter must 
necessarily be “incorporeal.” The second related trait of the narrative that we find 
in Blackstone is the identification of property with physical possession. Hohfeld 
(1913) admits that “Much of the difficulty, as regards legal terminology, arises from 
the fact that many of our words were originally applicable only to physical things; 
so that their use in connection with legal relations is, strictly speaking, figurative 
or fictional.” Even with all the difficulty that comes with the ambiguity, the fixation 
on the relation to the physical in conceiving property in this narrative not only sur-
vives historically but also becomes dominant. The famous Locke’s reflection that 
we shall turn to shortly, identifies its fundamental trait in the act of appropriation 
through physical contact. This can be termed as the physical metaphor in proper-
ty. It is important to notice that this dominance is not present only in theory but 
also in legal practice. As Hohfeld (1913) notices, in Wilson v. Ward Lumber Co it 
is stated that “The term ‘property’, as commonly used denotes any external object 
over which the right of property is exercised” and at the same time that “property 
... in a determinate object, is composed of certain constituent elements, to wit: The 
unrestricted right of use, enjoyment, and disposal, of that object.”
In this manner, the philosophical Cartesian narrative in a particular historical 
moment in the western culture comes to shape how we think of property and conse-
quentially how this field of law develops. Property in this manner becomes defined 
by the existence of a single cogito that through its spatial existence appropriates 
other physical entities. Property is understood on the basis of possession and the 
impossibility of two things occupying the same space at the same time determi-
nant for possession becomes determinant for property, and exclusion is taken to 
be essential. A multiplicity that has property in the same thing is by consequence 
a contradiction. It can only be understood as lack of property. At the same time, 
the ambivalence between property as the physical thing or a non-physical claim 
stays unresolved. Blackstone’s original Cartesianism and physical metaphor had 
become the conceptual determinant of law.
2
Here we skip on a more exhaustive commentary on property in the natural law the-
ories of Pufendorf, Grotius and others. We will focus directly on Locke, but this is 
not to say that mentioned theories are less important. Locke presented his famous 
natural law account of property in the section Of Property in the Treatise. There 
Locke ([1690] 1991: 286) commenced his argument by claiming that “God... has giv-
en the Earth to the Children of Men, given it to mankind in common.”
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The use of the phrase “in common” certainly catches attention in the context of 
our inquiry. Some interpreters understand Locke’s argument as referring to common 
ownership while others take it to mean simply the absence of ownership, or open 
access property. “That which is common is not ownership” (Valcke 1989: 957). Be-
fore dealing with that issue let us first take look how Locke’s argument developed.
In the next step, Locke explicitly relied upon the concept of natural rights. In 
his theory, these generally range from the broad and abstract, to the narrow and 
materialistic. Among the former are the rights to one’s own life and liberty. The 
latter relate to rights to produce not only useful consumer goods but also to any 
concomitant producer-good. The main example of a producer-good was improved 
land, as explained in section 27 of Locke’s Second Treatise ([1690] 1991: 287): 
Though the earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man 
has a Property in his own Person. This no body has any Right to but himself. The 
Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. What-
soever then, he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he 
hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and there-
by makes it his Property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature 
placed it in, hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common 
right of other men. 
Finally, in the section 27 of the Treatise, Locke amplifies and qualifies his the-
ory of appropriation, or creation of property, as follows, “For this labour being the 
unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what 
that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common 
for others” This clause is recognized in the literature as Lockean “proviso” and it 
somewhat obscured his general argument, and much has subsequently been writ-
ten in attempts to fully understand it. As it is well known, this statement lead to a 
lot of controversy among interpreters as some put more accent on Locke’s account 
of appropriation and took him to be a proto libertarian thinker while others relied 
on proviso and understood him to be a kind of socialist.3
What is important in the context of our inquiry both when we think of the open-
ing claim of things being held in common and the proviso is that Locke reserves 
the concept of property for the result of the act of appropriation. This is the main 
focus of his explanation. Proviso and the initial commonality of things provide the 
context within which property emerges. They are not an object of explanation. It 
is within the context defined by them that Locke explains how property emerg-
es. Thus the property in question is the exclusive property of an agent against all 
others, that is precisely in the foundation of the vision of clear and strong prop-
erty rights. It is only the existence of this this type of property rights, taken to be 
property rights as such that has to be explained and justified, while the context 
that was there before them is not considered as an institutional creation with its 
own rules and ways of operating.
Additionally, Locke’s case relates to the well-known concept in liberal theory 
of government: the maximum liberty of the individual. In this approach, one of 
main duties of government is to protect property rights. Property rights are cen-
tral as they are the medium through which the individual practices her liberty. The 
3  See for example the work of James Tully and Robert Nozick.
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dominant negative-liberty-based (Berlin 1969) liberalism implies that to allow for 
the maximum practice of liberty is to allow the individual to act in any way it de-
sires on the condition that this does not make any limitation of freedom of others. 
According to the definition, negative liberty is the absence of obstacles, barriers or 
constraints. In this sense, property is equated to the legal institute that delineates 
the object and allows the individual to act in this unconstrained manner. This is 
related to the strength that the property rights should have. Similarly, to the case 
of Blackstone, the property that is limited appears to be no property at all.
3
A more exhaustive comment would certainly include an account of utilitarian revolt 
against natural law arguments on property. Due to the limited space and the need 
to focus only on the essential milestones, we will not go in that direction. Instead 
we will now turn to the economic theories that dealt with property.
Beginning with economists we should note that most of them do not even con-
sider property explicitly – this is particularly problematic as the economic relations 
they analyse can only exist inasmuch they are legally articulated. And as many of 
them are concerned with exchange they are especially dependent on how proper-
ty is articulated. This may as well be the most destructive outcome of the reduc-
tionism in the basis of the vision of clear and strong property rights. Here we will 
consider only those economists that did recognize the decisive role of property for 
the economic relations 
First among them is certainly Adam Smith. Smith, one of the fathers of eco-
nomics considered himself as a moral philosopher writing from a Lockean point of 
view. In his “Lecture on Justice,” Smith (1896) made one important distinction that 
departed from Locke’s reasoning: he confined natural rights to the rights to liber-
ty and life, whereas the right to property was an acquired right depending on the 
current disposition of society. “The rights which a man has to the preservation of 
his body and reputation from injury are called natural...” (Smith 1896: 401). Smith’s 
separation of natural rights from the rights to property are further expressed in the 
following quotation from his Glasgow lectures: 
The origin of natural rights is quite evident. That a person has a right to have his 
body free from injury, and his liberty free from infringement unless there be a proper 
cause, nobody doubts. But acquired rights such as property require more explana-
tion. Property and civil government very much depend on one another. The preser-
vation of property and the inequality of possession first formed it, and the state of 
property must always vary with the form of government. (Smith 1896: 401) 
Smith spent quite a lot of energy in arguing why the inequality that follows 
property is justified and this is something of interest for our inquiry.
Before going into that we should consider that Smith’s argument that almost 
explicitly argues for clear and strong property rights. Importantly, even though he 
assigned right to property the status of acquired right, he famously condemned all 
legislation that interfered with free individual trading. Such freedom to trade af-
fected the incentive to create and maintain property. Because of the existence of 
continuous markets, prices were being kept reasonably stable and thus incentives 
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to further property accumulation, were emerging. Accumulation of property as 
capital, in turn, was encouraging further divisions of labour that is, specializations 
and these were resulting in sustained technological progress. This argument direct-
ly treated property as the foundation of trade and Smith showed consciousness of 
the legal foundation of the economic reality that is rare among economists that 
followed. At the same time, we can see that this recognition of the role of property 
implied also a reduction in its understanding. Property that is foundational for ex-
change is the property of the sole owner with power to transfer the good. It was this 
type of property that Smith as a Lockean considered. Any other type of property 
that could have been relevant for economic reflection is absent from his account. 
This relates to the issue between property and inequality. It is precisely the prop-
erty of sole owner with power to sell that implies unequal relations. On the other 
hand, any type of property that at the same time implies many owners with dif-
ferent rights to the resource creates at least a limited sphere where the distinction 
is not between more or less but between different ways of relating to the resource.
4
A caesura in the historical development of the vision of strong and clear proper-
ty rights occurred when Smith begun to explicitly refer to its beneficial economic 
role. As the vision played an essential role in conceiving the economic mechanism 
that leads to desirable outcomes, the rising importance of this economic mecha-
nism was paralleled by the rising importance of the vision itself. One of the most 
illustrative cases of this is the thought of Ludwig Von Mises. Within the socialist 
calculus debate Mises defended the superiority of market mechanism on the basis 
of its relation to property. Peter Boettke provides a very clear account on the es-
sential role that property plays in the Austrian economists’ position in the debate:
Mises does present four arguments which include: (1) private property and incentives, 
(2) monetary prices and the economizing role they play, (3) profit and loss account-
ing, and (4) political environment. In a fundamental sense, all of these arguments 
are derivative of an argument for private property. Without private property, there 
can be no advanced economic process... Mises had to explain how private proper-
ty engenders incentives which motivate individuals to husband resources efficient-
ly... [and] that the real problem was one of calculation within the dynamic world of 
change, in which the lure of pure profit and the penalty of loss would serve a vital 
error detection and correction role in the economic process... [and] finally... that the 
suppression of private property leads to political control over individual decisions 
and thus the eventual suppression of political liberties to the concerns of the collec-
tive... On the other hand, the private property market economy is able to solve each 
of [these]... economic issues, and constitutional democracy does seek to guarantee 
individual rights, and protect against the tyranny of majority.
It is important to notice that in explaining their understanding of what proper-
ty is Austrian economists referred to spontaneity and nature. As Hodgson shows, 
Von Mises (1981: 27) considered property as “purely a physical relationship of man 
to the goods, independent of social relations between men or of a legal order” and 
his defence of property, exchange and markets does not promote a clearly-de-
fined socio-economic system. This in turn led to somewhat simplified concept of 
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exchange economy as according to Hodgson (2010: 42) exchange is defined sim-
ply as an action. 
Here we can observe how in a context that is no longer encumbered by issues 
of natural law, Von Mises still gives a naturalist account of property. Again, simi-
larly to natural law theories, this implies that one type of property arrangement, 
that concerning one actor, tight of exclusion and power of transfer is isolated as 
the only property arrangement possible.
The other great economist participating in the calculus debate was Friedrich 
Hayek. Hayek was not explicitly naturalist when it came to property. Among many 
arguments related to property that he makes, maybe the most useful for our purposes 
is Hayek’s identification private property as the fundament of modern civilization:
Modern civilization, which enables us to maintain four billion people in this world, 
was made possible by the institution of private property. It’s only thanks to this in-
stitution that we achieved an extensive order far exceeding anybody’s knowledge, 
and if we destroy that moral basis, which consists in the recognition of private prop-
erty, I think it will destroy the sources which nourish present day mankind and 
create a catastrophe of starvation beyond anything mankind has yet experienced 
(Hayek, internet).
The point of Hayek’s discourse revolves around the point that private property 
is the only institution that allows sustained coordination and progress. Addition-
ally, as he made clear in the calculus debate, the exclusive type of property right 
belonging to the individual is based upon the right measure of responsibility and 
knowledge. It makes the owner responsible for his activity, incentivized to utilize 
the property to his benefit with knowledge that he posses. This account marginal-
izes all the other property arrangements as leading to lack of clarity about respon-
sibilities and lack of incentives to act with economic interest.4
5
If we can recapitulate previous accounts of property in economics as being essen-
tially interested in how the exclusive property belonging to the individual, regarded 
as baseline property arrangement, couples with market exchange that it allows for, 
the following economic arguments go a step further. These link clear and strong 
property rights to a functional economic system and take a look at cases within this 
system where the same logic can be extended to deal with remaining problems and 
disfunctionalities. There are two dominant strands in which this has been done: 
one related to the tragedy of commons and the other to property and externality 
in law-and-economics.
Hayek’s argument is strongly reminiscent of the tragedy of commons. The lat-
ter is certainly one of the most prominent articulations of the vision of clear and 
strong property rights. Two of the most famous tragedy-of-commons arguments 
4  It is important to notice here the argument made by professor Hodgson on the fact 
that the socialist opponents of Austrian economists in the debate were not any better in 
conceptualizing property. Their positions stemmed from the early ones arguing for aboli-
tion of property to the later ones leaning on neoclassical economics and neglecting the is-
sue of property completely.
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were made by Garret Hardin (1968) and Harold Demsetz (1974). While Hardin 
pictures commons as a lack of any kind of property and in this manner adopts the 
implication of the vision that the strong and clear property rights are the only true 
property rights, Demsetz apparently recognizes the communal ownership:
Suppose that land is communally owned. Every person has the right to hunt, till, or 
mine the land. This form of ownership fails to concentrate the cost associated with 
any person’s exercise of his communal rights on that person. If a person seeks to 
maximize the value of his communal rights, he will tend to overhunt and overwork 
the land because some of the costs of his doing so are borne by others. The stock of 
game and the richness of the soil will be diminished too quickly... If a single person 
owns the land, he will attempt to maximize its present value by taking into account 
alternative future time streams of benefits and costs and selecting that one which 
he believes will maximize the present value of his privately-owned land rights... 
The land ownership example confronts us immediately with a great disadvantage 
of communal property. The effects of a person’s activities on his neighbours and on 
subsequent generations will not be taken into account fully. Communal property re-
sults in great externalities. The full costs of the activities of an owner of a communal 
property right are not borne directly by him, nor can they be called to his attention 
easily by the willingness of others to pay him an appropriate sum… (Demsetz 1974)
Demsetz identifies the division of the commons into private property as a key 
tool for overcoming the inefficiencies generated by pervasive externalities. “[P]ri-
vate ownership of land,” he says, “will internalize many of the external costs asso-
ciated with communal ownership.” This is because the private owner “can general-
ly count on realizing the rewards associated with husbanding game and increasing 
the fertility of his land.” Because the owner’s wealth is now tied to the skill with 
which she cares for her property, she has the incentive to use the resources on that 
property as efficiently as possible. In this manner commons that splits the prop-
erty rights among multiple actors, implies lack of clarity. It allows for illusion in 
accounting of activities of users. Only the sole proprietor that does not share prop-
erty can account for its use in the adequate manner. 
It should be clear by now that tragedy of commons is the exemplary case for the 
clear and strong property rights vision. The starkness of the argument is probably 
more visible in Hardin’s version according to which there seems to be nothing out 
there before exclusionary individual rights are established. On the other hand, Dem-
setz’ version clarifies a further important point. Even if some other arrangement is 
recognized as property formally, what seems to be implied is that it lacks the nec-
essary conditions for it to be a right with economic role. The economic role of the 
property rights comes only with the exclusive individual rights being put in place.
6
The most famous application of the economic rationale to the object of property 
and externality is the one provided by Ronald Coase. It came to be epitomized by 
George Stigler (1987) as the Coase theorem. Coase develops this argument refer-
ring to a variety of other legal solutions to externalities like tax, liability, or dam-
age. Indeed, the theorem draws its significance from the fact that it can be utilized 
in a very general context of policy and regulation. 
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Let us take the known example of farmer and the cattle rancher live in vicinity 
to each other. Coase intends to tackle the problem of externality and thus we sup-
pose that their productive activities interfere. The farmer grows corn on some of his 
land and leaves some of it uncultivated. The rancher runs cattle over all of her land. 
The boundary between the ranch and the farm is clear, but there is no fence. Thus, 
from time to time, the cattle wander onto the farmer’s property and damage the 
corn. There is a harm suffered because of the interference of productive activities.
The damage could be reduced in a number of ways: by building a fence, con-
tinually supervising the cattle, keeping fewer cattle, or growing less corn. Each of 
the ways of reducing damage is costly. 
There are two possible patterns of dealing with the harm. The rancher and the 
farmer could bargain with each other to decide who should bear the cost of the 
damage. Alternatively, the hard law could intervene from the outset and assign li-
ability for the damages. If the case is presented before the law, Coase argues that 
the main relevant issue that is to be considered with the achievement of a valid 
decision is the possibility of bargaining between parties.
There are two specific rules the law could adopt, both relying on introducing a 
responsibility for the damage:
 1.  The farmer is responsible for keeping the cattle off his property, and he 
must pay for the damages when they get in (a regime we could call „ ranchers’ 
rights” or „open range”), or
 2.  The rancher is responsible for keeping the cattle on her property, and she 
must pay for the damage when they get out („farmers’ rights” or „closed 
range”). (Cooter and Ulen 2012)
Under the first rule, the farmer would have no legal recourse against the dam-
age done by his neighbour’s cattle. To reduce the damage, the farmer would have 
to grow less corn or fence his cornfields. Under the second rule, the rancher must 
build a fence to keep the cattle on her property. If the cattle escape, the law could 
ascertain the facts, determine the monetary value of the damage, and make the 
rancher pay the farmer.
At this point Coase introduces monetary values relevant for the parties. For this, 
monetary evaluation of harm by the parties has to be determined. Coase ([1960] 
2009: 3) proposes that in all of the cases of interference of rights it is an imperative 
to begin by treating rights as productive factors. This pertains to the introduction 
of parties as utility-maximizing agents with budgetary constraints and production 
functions. For example, suppose that when the problem of efficiency is introduced, 
it is concluded with absolute certainty that:
efficiency requires the farmer to build a fence around his cornfields, rather than the 
rancher to build a fence around her ranch. (Cooter and Ulen 2012)
This is followed up by a further consideration of outcomes under different legal 
decisions. Both legal rules (ranchers’ and farmers’ rights) are considered with ap-
propriate monetary values and it is concluded that looking at legal rules as a judge 
would, with focus on the question of who is responsible for the damage, the first 
rule seems to be more efficient than the second rule, which saves.
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At this point Coase presents his famous argument. According to Coase, this 
efficiency is only apparent. By bargaining to an agreement, rather than following 
the law non-cooperatively, the rancher and the farmer can save the amount that is 
saved in the most efficient scenario. That is, if the parties can bargain successful-
ly with each other, the efficient outcome will be achieved, regardless of the ruling 
of law. Cooperation leads to the fence being built around the farmer’s cornfields, 
despite the fact that the second legal rule (farmers’ rights) was controlling. Thus 
Coase concludes that the greater efficiency of the first legal rule is apparent, not 
real. In view of the cooperative surplus, parties will start from their threat values 
and try to settle in the manner that allows them to reach more desirable outcome. 
For each of the parties, appropriation of any part of the surplus makes the bar-
gaining worthwhile. The following argument is at the same time a proof of the 
priority of the bargaining/transaction cost consideration for dealing with cases of 
interference of rights. 
Coase used the term “transaction cost” to consider the possible obstacles to the 
depicted process. If the inherent costs of bargaining between the parties were to 
pass the supposed threshold of bargaining surplus, this would imply that there is 
nothing to be gained from cooperation.
This type of analysis led to the articulation of the famous Coase theorem:
When transaction costs are zero, an efficient use of resources results from private bar-
gaining, regardless of the legal assignment of property rights.
The theorem points out towards an invariance. Its most important achievement 
is that it synthetizes two disciplines and two problems: externality, a problem usu-
ally treated by economists and property rights—i.e., law. Its proposition suggest-
ed an effort to use property rights to solve problems of externalities in a variety of 
situations. This became an important proposal fundamental to law and economics 
but also to economics and law as distinct disciplines.
Essentially the theorem points out that externalities are something that pri-
vate parties can deal with if the conditions necessary for bargaining to take place 
are present (Kennedy 1998: 4). This was a highly counter-intuitive conclusion at 
the time, as externalities were understood to be costs incurred privately but paid 
externally. Coase pointed out that the reciprocal relation between the parties that 
appears as if one is harming the other can become object of their own negotiation.
What is crucial in the consideration of Coase within the genesis of the vision 
of clear and strong property rights is the idea of the spontaneity of bargaining. In 
Coase’s view the liability defined and allocated by the court will immediately be 
taken up by the bargaining process. Within this process the actors will treat it as 
property and they will reallocate it on the basis of their evaluations. This process 
is only possible as the court has defined the right that was contested between par-
ties as a strong right with clear definition of its limits. Lack of clarity and strength 
of property rights is by definition implying rise in transaction costs. As we have 
seen Coase does recognize that this type of cases will take place, but the point is 
to understand that at that point the issue is already framed and economic analysis 
is inherently inclined to further one type of property arrangement while not even 
noticing its’ possible alternatives. 
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Tragedy of commons and Coasean analysis of externalities were quite influential 
as lessons on how to do economics with explicit focus on property rights. Among 
many strands that adopted these lessons, the approach that came to be known as 
economic analysis of property rights is among the most pertaining and most recog-
nized. This will be the last case that we will treat even though when we get closer 
to the present times the explicit connection to the vision of clear and strong prop-
erty rights seems to be ever more pervasive.
When it comes to EAPR proponents, maybe the most controversial and visible 
aspect of the approach is its’ habit of defining pre-legal facts independent of any 
normativity as rights. This relates to the point previously made about Demsetz 
who can be taken as forbearer of the EAPR approach. Alchian (1965) for example, 
defined private property rights in terms of assignments of the ability to choose the 
use of goods (without affecting the property of other persons). Later Alchian (1977: 
238) defined these rights in relation to ‘the probability that [owner’s] decision about 
demarcated uses of the resource will determine the use’. In the same vein, Barzel 
(1997: 394) defined property as “an individual’s net valuation, in expected terms, of 
the ability to directly consume the services of the asset, or to consume it indirectly 
through exchange.” As he underlines “[the] key word is ability: the definition is con-
cerned not with what people are legally entitled to do but with what they believe 
they can do.” Barzel is also famous for his distinction between economic and legal 
property rights. According to him (Barzel 1997: 3) the term ‘property rights’ carries 
two distinct meanings in the economic literature: “One . . . is essentially the abil-
ity to enjoy a piece of property. The other, much more prevalent and much older, 
is essentially what the state assigns to a person. He decides to designate the first 
‘economic property rights’ and the second ‘legal (property) rights’.” Later he goes on 
to explain that “economic rights are the end (that is, what people ultimately seek), 
whereas legal rights are the means to achieve the end. Legal rights play a primarily 
supporting role...” Finally, Allen (2014: 4) claims that in his view “Following oth-
ers, economic property rights are defined as the ability to freely exercise a choice.” 
Hodgson (2015a: 11) rightly notices this general intuition can be interpreted to 
stem out from the standpoint adopted by property rights economists according to 
whom the ‘structure of property rights’ refers primarily to a set of constraints upon, 
and incentives and disincentives for, specific individual behaviours. This diagnosis 
rings a bell in the argument put forward recently by Di Robillant and Syed (forth-
coming) that a deeper issue in L&E approach to property has to do with the habit 
of omitting of the legal-architectural issues (what property is) related to property 
law and rushing into substantial issues (how property emerges and what incentive 
structure it implies) that involve cost analysis.
Hodgson’s criticism of this way of approaching property is maybe best summa-
rized in the following passage:
When [some of EAPR authors] referred to property they reduced it simply to the fact 
of possession or control. Likewise, when [others among them] refer to ‘ economic 
rights’ they simply mean possession or control. My objection to these accounts is 
illustrated by the case of a thief who manages to steal an item and retain control of 
it. According to [the former] this would become the thief’s ‘property’. According to 
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[the latter], the thief would have established an ‘economic right’ to the stolen goods. 
(Hodgson 2015b: 736)
In a way the approach perused by EAPR authors summarizes many of the im-
portant points present in previous cases. First of all, it reminds explicitly of Black-
stone with its substitution of property with possession. The abstract relational 
character of property as legal arrangement can easily be marginalized by the sim-
plicity of possession as an individual physical fact. Secondly, the argument has a 
clear naturalist connotation as actors involved seem to behave according to innate 
principles described as utility maximisation for the present purpose. Finally, EAPR 
case takes the Coasean intuition of putting theoretical priority on pre-legal reality 
in approaching legal institutions a step further when instead of bargaining it in-
troduces the cases of robbery and others.
III
The cases of economic arguments for strong and clear property rights imply that 
only if these exist a beneficial cooperation between different actors is possible. 
The paradoxical nature of the underlying argument that has reached the status of 
common sense is that the strength and clarity of the property rights in reality con-
sists of clearest possible delineation of the subject and the strongest right to ex-
clude others. What makes the argument paradoxical is that intuitively one would 
think that cooperation is linked to inclusion and not exclusion. It is precisely this 
possibility that is being erased by the presented arguments. 
In the context of tragedy of commons, the potential of inclusion beyond the 
scope of clear and strong property rights was the object of study of Elinor Ostrom. 
Still Ostrom’s understanding of the legal and proprietary side of the commons relies 
on the bundle of rights conception that we will comment upon shortly. At this point 
though it is important to notice that Ostrom doesn’t consider proprety arrangements 
in their substantial differences but stays on the level of providing comments how 
commons can lead to non tragic outcomes within appropriate legal frames. On the 
other hand, in the analysis of externalities after Coase, even less was done. While 
the so called heterodoxical Coaseans noted that sometimes transaction costs are 
indeed high, this was never a reason enough to consider inclusion as a possibility 
to deal with externalities. One strand of Coaseans considered public ownership and 
facilitation of bargaining while the other, spearheaded by Guido Calabresi consid-
ered inalienability. In both cases cooperation within a common property regime 
that relies on the well-defined inclusion of multiple participants with developed 
models of participator decision making was not seriously considered.
One possible understanding that could stem from the previous exposition of 
the vision of clear and strong property rights as based in the idea of individual ex-
clusive owner is that all that has to be done to combat it is to summon the bundle 
of rights theory. In relation to the points made previously we should be remind-
ed that both Ostrom, Coase and Calabresi adopt this theory. The theory is vague-
ly connected to arguments put forward by Wesley Hohfeld, but as contemporary 
interpreters (di Robilant and Syed) point out thing can become difficult when we 
try to coherently present an account of bundle of rights theory in relation to his 
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approach. On the other hand, very explicit and clear theorization of property as 
bundle of right can and is usually related to the work of Tony Honoré. Let us take 
a moment here to consider it. Honoré explicitly articulates what he defines as full 
ownership. It consists of the following bundle of rights: 
 1)  Right of Use: Alf has a right to use X, that is, 
 (a)  Alf has a liberty to use X, and 
 (b)  Alf has a claim on others to refrain from use of X. 
 (2)  Right of Exclusion (or possession): Others may use X if and only if Alf con-
sents, that is, 
(a)  If Alf consents others have a liberty to use X; 
(b)  If Alf does not consent others have a duty not to use X. 
 (3)  Right to Compensation: If someone damages or uses X without Alf’s  consent, 
then Alf has a right to compensation from that person. 
 (4)  Rights to Destroy, Waste, or Modify: Alf has a liberty to destroy X, waste it, 
or change it. 
 (5)  Right to Income: Alf has a claim to the financial benefits of forgoing his own 
use of X and letting someone else use it. 
 (6)  Absence of Term: Alf’s rights over X are of indefinite duration. 
 (7)  Liability to Execution: X may be taken away from Alf for repayment of a debt. 
 (8)  Power of Transfer: Alf may permanently transfer (1)–(7) to specific persons 
by consent.
Having the previous point in mind it is quite easy to recognize some implicit 
presuppositions of Blackstone and Locke explicitly stated by Honoré. Looking at 
this list, two things are of particular importance. First according to Honoré, sub-
traction or even a limiting definition of any of the rights from the bundle makes 
the property become less than a full one. In this way Honoré dismisses the possi-
bility that it would be a different type of property, and solely on the basis it being 
less it is deed not to be property in its full form of existence. Secondly, as we can 
see, Honoré’s bundle presupposes that property is something that belongs to a sin-
gular actor, Alf. The idea of there being multiple interrelated actors with sharing 
the mentioned rights is out of the picture. To the amount that this is the case, we 
can conclude that even Honoré’s type of bundle of rights theory complicates the 
issue of property by distinguishing among different elements that form a proper-
ty arrangement, it still does not break away from the idea of exclusive individual 
ownership as paradigmatic case of property. Consequently, the fact that certain 
authors rely on bundle of rights conception does not amount to proving that they 
escape the vision of strong and clear property rights.
To conclude one can ask a question that should have become obvious by now: 
What about legal reality of property? Does it recognize inclusion and commons? The 
answer is the positive one but it deserves a number additional clarifications about 
further investigation. These will have to serve instead of a more final conclusion.
Firstly, the legal reality of inclusionary property arrangements is a diverse one. 
From the commons fisheries and forestries described by Ostrom, worker managed 
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factories and citizen managed water systems, community land trusts and P2P net-
works and right to roam, the alternative to strong and clear property rights is di-
verse field. Inclusion can be a defined and conditional one, or it can just be a lack 
of exclusion as in cases of open access. The number of included and the activity 
of the included can be defined or they can be unspecified. Finally, the participato-
ry decision making that is underlying this type of property arrangement can be of 
very different kinds. It is important to understand that this reality exists and de-
velops on the margins of a legal field dominated by the vision of strong and clear 
property rights. It develops in places where the dominant model is so explicitly 
unsuccessful, inapplicable or there is no interest of actors to propose its applica-
tion. Accordingly, its diversity is related to the specific context of the resource and 
the actors connected to it. 
Secondly, in thinking about the reality of proprietary relations once we free 
ourselves from the false binarity, a general conclusion can be made. The point is 
that there is no property with big ‘’P’’. Instead there are different arrangements 
and combinations, among which none is more property than any other. Differ-
ent bundles can be designed following logic of the relations established, and none 
of the is better than others as such. The value judgment should always have made 
comparing different ones with the attention to the context of the specific resource.
Thirdly once, we understand that there is no clarifying and strengthening, we 
can become open to innovating and starting over in design and allocation of prop-
erty rights. As Kennedy (2011) rightly points out historically this starting over has 
happened many times over and new property arrangements are constantly emerg-
ing. At the same time, this dynamic is interconnected with visions that assert them-
selves as dominant. The vision of property treated as essentially exclusionary right 
in the hands of the individual has made visible impact and has at the same time 
been reinforced by social legal processes on the ground. In fact, the only way for 
this commentary to be complete is to have coupled with an account of social con-
text that surrounds the intellectual production of reflections we witnessed. The 
period from Blackstone to Smith is determined by the primary enclosure of com-
mons, while the socialist calculus debate is related to property transformations 
before and during Cold war and finally, the accounts of Hardin, Demsetz, Coase 
and EAPR authors precedes and parallels the so called new enclosures. There has 
already been a lot of work on this context and this connection, but an encompass-
ing account relating it to the issue of property and the vision that has dominated 
this field is certainly still lacking.
Finally, even if we try to think in narrower economic terms about property, we 
should not allow ourselves to be constrained by the usual imperative as transac-
tions cannot be distorted by change in property rights because these only occur in 
the shadow of law. Need to take the economic impact of property arrangements 
is certainly a crucial one. As Kennedy notice this is especially true in the contem-
porary world as the complexity of property rights parallels the rise of general so-
cial complexity in the ever more interconnected network of actors. The need for a 
more reflected practice of property management in societies only becomes more 
pressing as the simple commonsensical recopies like that of clear and strong prop-
erty rights are shown to be unsuccessful in accruing the promised results. At the 
THE COMMONS │ 235
same time, previous pages should have made even more cautious than we already 
might have been, as this type of recipe is shown to be routed much deeper in our 
thinking than we have previously recognized. As many cases of post-structuralist 
accounts have shown, escaping strong pattern of binary opposition proves to be 
much more difficult than it might seem. Still the fact that today’s society is slowly 
discovering ways to incorporate non-conformity and weakness towards achieving 
its’ end should motivate us to push further in the case of property.
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O zaslepljujućoj jasnoći svojinskih prava:  
sedam fragmenata o redukcionizmu u teoriji svojine
Apstrakt
Ovaj članak se sastoji od istorijskog komentara na argumente u teoriji svojine koji osnažuju 
viziju jakih i jasnih svojinskih prava, koja je dominantna u savremenom razvojnom polisiju. 
Nadovezujući se na članak Dankana Kenedija iz 2013. koji je izneo prvu analizu ove vizije, 
ovaj članak se bavi nizom dodatnih pitanja koja se tiču njenog nastanka. Da bi postigao ovaj 
cilj, u članku se oslanjam na genealoški pristup u širem smislu koji je usredsređen na binarnu 
opoziju prisutnu u teoriji svojine od njenih istorijskih početaka u Zapadnoj misli. Ova meto-
dologija omogućava da se problem konceptualizuje na supstantivniji način nego što je to 
učinjeno od strane Kenedija i da se pokaže kakav radikalan iskorak je potreban da bi se pre-
vazišli problemi koje pomenuta vizija nosi sa sobom.
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